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COMP ARATIVE DROUGHT STRATEGIES
THE SOVIET UNION

PAUL E. LYDOLPH

T he Russian experience must be understood

experiences higher maximum temperatures in
summer than Kharkov does. The central black
earth region of the Russian Republic lies even
farther north. Thus, most of the farmland of
the Soviet Union is more comparable latitudinally and climatically to parts of Canada than
to the United States. In the wheat lands of
southwestern Siberia, Omsk, at a latitude of
55°, lies farther north than any agricultural
settlement in Canada, except perhaps the
Peace River Valley, which, of course, is only a
restricted area. In these northern regions, the
Soviets must consider not only moisture
supply but always heat supply as well (Lydolph
1963).
The other primary climatic control, topography, in Eurasia is oriented almost perpendicularly to that in North America. Whereas high
mountains run north-south in the western
part of North America, Eurasia has high
mountains running west-east across the
southern part of the continent. This topography accounts for moisture gradients in the two
land masses that are essentially perpendicular
to each other. (Lydolph 1977d). In North
America east of the Rocky Mountains, moisture supply decreases from east to west. In the
Soviet Union, it decreases from north to

in terms of some major contrasts between the
Soviet Union and North America, some of
which are climatic and some cultural.
CLIMATE

Background. It cannot be emphasized
enough that the Soviet Union is a highlatitude country. Odessa on the Black Sea
coast, one of Russia's southern cities, lies at a
latitude of 46°N, comparable to that of
Billings, Montana, and in fact is cooler in
summer than Billings (Lydolph 1977b). Krasnodar in the Kuban District of the North
Caucasus, probably the most productive region in the Soviet Union, compares latitudinally and climatically to St. Paul, Minnesota.
Kharkov, in the northeastern Ukraine, compares to Winnipeg, Canada; in fact, Winnipeg
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south. Thus, whereas in eastern North America the temperature and moisture gradients are
essentially perpendicular to one another, in
the Soviet Union they are parallel and opposite in direction, leading to fewer combinations
of heat and moisture supply than can be found
in eastern North America. In the Soviet
Union the north is cold, wet, and poorly
drained while the warmer south is dry. Except
for very small areas, such as the Colchis
Lowland of western Georgia in the T ranscaucasus, there is no long, hot, or very moist
growing season.
Therefore, agriculture in the Soviet Union
is scrunched between the cold north and the
dry south. And since heat limitations on crop
production generally come into play before
moisture limitations do, the better agriculture
in the Soviet Union has become concentrated
in the steppes of southern Russia, the Ukraine,
and northern Kazakhstan (fig. 1). Thus, the
semiarid zone of the Soviet Union by and large

FIG. 1. Distribution of sown area in the USSR.

is the best agricultural area the Soviet Union
has to offer, whereas the Great Plains do not
constitute the prime agricultural area of the
United States. That means the Soviet Union,
much more than the United States, must
produce its food and fiber in a hazardous
climate, and its possible crop combinations are
considerably more limited than those in the
United States. There simply is not an ideal
place to grow corn or soybeans in the Soviet
Union.

The human element. There are about forty
million more people in the Soviet Union than
in the United States, so the Soviets must try to
feed more people by agriculture that is carried
on in a less conducive environment. Also,
since most of the people reside in the fertile
wedge of agricultural land occupying only a
small portion of the country, population
pressure on farmland has always been much
higher in the Soviet Union than in either the
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United States or Canada. While the rural
population density is approximately 8 persons
per square mile in Nebraska, 10 in Kansas, and
5 in North Dakota, it is 142 in Vinnitsa Oblast
of the western Ukraine, 184 in adjacent
Moldavia, 67 in Kharkov Oblast of the eastern
Ukraine, and 73 in Krasnodar Oblast in the
North Caucasus (Narodnoe khozyaystvo
SSSR v 1983g). Even the drier middle Volga
region has a rural population density of 21
persons per square mile, and the dry steppe
regions of western Siberia and northern
Kazakhstan average about 12-13 persons per
square mile. Thus, there are many more people
trying to make their livelihood off the land in
the Soviet Union than in North America.

Land tenure. The land tenure system
throughout T sarist times was detrimental to
conservation of the land. The peasant who
worked the land never had much vested
interest in it. Before emancipation of the serfs
in 1861 most agricultural land was held in large
estates owned either by the Crown, the
orthodox church, or noblemen. And after the
emancipation most of this land did not pass
over to the peasants directly. Much of the land
that was eventually divided up was turned
over to the miT, or village, to be held and
worked communally.
The arable land was frequently reapportioned, so individual peasant households were
never sure how long they might have control
of the same fields. Also, fields were usually laid
out in long, narrow strips oriented parallel to
slopes so that each household would be
assured of all portions of the soil catena.
Although this arrangement fostered equity
among households, it wreaked havoc with the
land. Deep gullies rapidly developed in furrows
oriented downslope, and the uncertainty of
land tenure induced farmers to invest as little
as possible in the land while extracting the
most from it during their control of it. Thus,
soil fertility depletion and tremendous erosion
took place over hundreds of years of land use,
the rectification of which has only been
addressed during the Soviet period. Of course,

the Soviets have formed huge state and
collective farms, so that farm workers still do
not have much vested interest in the land, but
state directives and incentives since the death
of Stalin have greatly improved farming practices.

Rural settlement. The steppe peasants have
always lived in large rural villages strung
helter-skelter in the stream valleys, out of the
wind and near water and woods along the
stream banks. In their never-ending quest for
wood for fuel for their thatched adobe khatas
during the long cold winters, the peasants
denuded the steep stream banks of their
wooded cover and further increased the erosion problem.
Self-sufficiency. Exacerbating the environmental limits placed on agriculture, which are
already being pushed to the edge of disaster, is
the Soviet desire to be as self-sufficient as
possible in all products. This has led to the
formulation of a hierarchy of priorities that
often results in a given crop being grown under
less than ideal conditions, even when ideal
conditions exist somewhere in the Soviet
Union. Briefly, a specialty crop that cannot be
grown anywhere else in the Soviet Union will
take first priority in the region in which it can
be grown. If a region is not needed for a
specialty crop, the most heavily yielding crop
will take priority even though it may be
growing under less than optimum conditions.
If an area does not need to be used for the most
heavily producing crop, then perhaps the crop
most ideally suited to that location will be
grown (Lydolph 1979,235).
Cotton, citrus, and tea are good examples
of specialty crops that can only be grown in
the very southern fringes of the country in
portions of Central Asia and the T ranscaucasus. During the Soviet era, cotton has expanded in Central Asia wherever it can be grown
and has displaced many food crops, particularly wheat and other grains, that used to satisfy
all the needs of the native populations in this
area. Thus, the Soviets have achieved self-
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sufficiency in cotton but have necessitated the
shipment of many foodstuffs into Central Asia
from other parts of the country. Similarly, in
western Georgia wherever citrus or tea can be
grown, they generally displace other crops.
Corn is a good example of a heavily
bearing crop that has displaced lesser yielding
crops. When Khrushchev initiated his farm
program in the mid-1950s, his primary objective was to improve the diet of the Soviet
people, primarily by increasing livestock products. This entailed a greatly expanded feed and
fodder base. Having visited Iowa, he was very
impressed with the sheer weight of green
matter that can be grown by corn. Therefore,
he rapidly ordered the planting of millions of
acres of corn in the Soviet Union. In order to
get decent yields the Soviets had to put corn in
regions offering the best combination of soil,
moisture, and heat. These regions were generally in portions of the Ukraine and the Kuban
district of the North Caucasus, the best winter
wheat areas of the country (Lydolph 1979,
247). Consequently, winter wheat had to be
displaced, and in order to maintain the level of
wheat production, the Soviets looked around
for other wheat-growing areas. They finally
settled upon the so-called Virgin Lands of
northern Kazakhstan and parts of adjacent
regions. Because this new area was considerably drier than the old wheat areas and had
much more severe winters with less snow
cover, wheat varieties had to be switched from
fall-sown to lower-yielding spring-sown. Wheat
yields in the "new lands" have consistently run
about half those in the winter wheat areas
(Cook et al. 1985, 5). So now the Soviets are
growing corn in a less than ideal area where
yields look pretty miserable and where much
of the corn can never be harvested as dry grain
but must be cut for silage and green fodder.
And because they are now growing a great deal
of their wheat in less than ideal conditions, the
yields look miserable by American or western
European standards. Nevertheless, by introducing these shifts in crops, the Soviets have
significantly increased their overall agricultural
production, particularly livestock products.

The desire for self-sufficiency has forced the
climate even further than was the case earlier.
A given deviation in moisture or heat supplies
during the growing season will generally
produce a more marked deviation in crop
response now that many crops are being grown
closer to their margins of disaster. Only during
the last few years, after a combination of
circumstances has produced a series of mediocreto-poor crops, have the Soviets apparently
retreated from this position of absolute selfsufficiency and decided to become permanent
major importers of feed and foodstuffs. As the
Soviet appetite has been whetted, the Soviet
leadership has apparently decided that it is
cheaper to import certain things than it is to
pour further investments into their attempts to
grow them. This is not to say that they have
ceased attempts to improve their own agriculture. This has certainly not been the case
during the last three decades, for they are still
pouring a disproportionate twenty-seven percent of their total capital investment each year
into agriculture, which accounts for only
about twenty percent of the gross national
product. Some western economists estimate
that Soviet agriculture is now the most heavily
subsidized agriculture in the world.
ADAPTATION TO
SEMIARID CONDITIONS

Agriculturalists whose lands now lie within
the Soviet Union have struggled with nature
in the steppes of Eurasia for more than a
thousand years, during which they have
evolved a way of life that is pretty well adapted
to the natural environment. During the later
years of the T sarist regime and throughout the
Soviet period, scientific organizations have
carried out high quality investigations under
the direction of such eminent scholars as the
soil scientist V. V. Dokuchaev and the climatologist A. 1. Voyeykov. Although practice
has often lagged well behind scientific discovery because of lack of funds, unwieldly organization, and peasant ignorance, many widesweeping programs have been instituted, particularly during the Soviet period.
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Irrigation. Irrigation has long been the
primary means of improving the moisture
balance in dry areas. It was practiced for
thousands of years by the natives in the
riverine civilizations of Central Asia, but the
Soviets have expanded it well into the steppelands of Moldavia, the Ukraine, the Caucasus,
the lower Volga, northern Kazakhstan, and
southern Siberia (fig. 2) (Lydolph 1977c, 102,
149, 246, 272). There is now more area under
irrigation in the Russian Republic than in the
Uzbek Republic of Central Asia, the traditional heartland of irrigation. After all, the same
amount of water can be spread over more land
in semiarid than in arid regions.
At present the Soviet Union has approximately twenty million hectares (about fifty
million acres) of land under irrigation, which
reportedly account for about one-third of the
crop production in the country. In contrast to
earlier times when irrigation was limited to
technical crops (cotton, etc.) and some fruits

and vegetables, it is being applied extensively
to forage crops and grains now that the Soviets
emphasize livestock products. In 1983, out of a
total sown area under irrigation of 15,288,100
hectares, 6,815,100 were occupied by fodder
crops (alfalfa, silage corn, etc.); 3,691,300 by
grains; 3,640,900 by technical crops; and
1,140,800 by potatoes, vegetables, and melons.
The rest of the 19,146,000 hectares of irrigated
land was in permanent pastures, natural
hayland, vineyards, orchards, and other perennial uses (N arodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v
1983g., 252-54).
The Soviets look to irrigation as the
primary means of intensifying agriculture on
land long cultivated by dry farming methods,
something they must do since they have little
virgin arable land left to open up to cultivation. But so far they have been slow in
adopting new water-saving technologies to
their water application in steppe regions. They
still rely primarily on furrow irrigation that

•

eo

FIG. 2. Irrigation in the USSR.
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they adapted from the long-irrigated desert
oases of Central Asia, where inefficient and
wasteful open-ditch methods are still predominant. Sprinkler irrigation is being introduced
fairly rapidly in such places as the southern
Ukraine, Lower Volga, and North Caucasus
regions. Sprinkler systems include tractorboom, tractor-spout, center-pivot, and wheel.
Center-pivot with a radius of 456 meters
(about 1500 feet) is becoming the most favored
method. One-time annual flood irrigation is
being practiced on floodplains, particularly to
improve pastures and natural hay lands. The
Soviets are beginning to talk about drip
irrigation for tree and vine crops.
The Soviets are installing some covered
conduits and lining canals to counter seepage
and evaporation, but they have a long way to
go. In this regard, an interesting suggestion has
been made for a pilot project to transfer some
water from western Siberia to central Asia
using the two pipelines installed during the late
1950s and early 1960s to convey natural gas
from the Gazli fields near Bukhara, Uzbekistan, to the Urals. These pipes are no longer
being used, and with some hookup eastward
they could carry excess Siberian water southward to see how it would best be utilized in
central Asia. The Soviets are also experimenting with protective films to retard evaporation
from open-water surfaces and canal liners,
such as polyethylene, to counter seepage.
Some irrigated areas are being equipped with
underground drainage networks to combat
secondary salinization. Unfortunately, no precise information is available on the location
and extent of such efforts or their degree of
success.
In many areas of the southern part of the
country there is not enough water to carry out
extensive plans for Irngation expansion.
Therefore, the ultimate plan has long been to
transfer water from northward-flowing rivers
into the southern dry lands (fig. 3). This topic
has elicited much discussion throughout the
Soviet Union and is still very much up in the
air. New concerns keep delaying projects, and
so far very little has been accomplished. At

present it appears that, although the Soviets
might be on the verge of initiating a scaleddown project on the small Sukhona River in
the European north, most of the larger projects are back on "square one" as planners
weigh advantages of investments of this sort
against investments in other sectors of their
economy and consider more efficient use of
water in dry areas.
Central planners, who appear to exhibit
some regional and racial biases, point out that
the Uzbeks of central Asia have allowed
irrigation systems to fall into disrepair. Canals
are leaky, and little is done to limit evaporation from them. Drainage systems are inadequate, so that brackish water accumulates and
secondary salinization occurs. The central
Asians have not yet done much to tap large
local water supplies in underground artesian
basins and high mountain glaciers, nor have
they done much to recycle water in industrial
plants or to switch to dry processing where
possible. As a first measure to bring about
some conservation, the government has recently initiated charges for water. This seems
to a Westerner something to be done without
saying, but it has not automatically been seen
as a thing to do within the Soviet ideological
context. It now appears that the Soviets view
interbasin water transfer as a last resort after
all other possibilities have been exhausted.
Any long-term plans to divert water will
consist of discrete shorter-term projects which
can be completed in stages so that investments
will not be irrevocably locked into huge
unfinished projects.
The Soviets are well aware of the heat
balance advantages of irrigation. The reduction
of albedo, the reduction of surface temperature,
the increase of relative humidity of the air next
to the earth's surface, with consequent reduction
of evaporation and earth radiation-all add up
to significantly increased heat balance available
for plant growth at the earth's surface. And
since, with few exceptions, even the warmer
parts of the Soviet Union are deficient in heat
resources, any subtle gains of usable heat loom
large to the Soviets.
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FIG. 3. Schematic map of water diversion projects. Width of arrow proportional to volume of
transfer. I. Northwest project; II. Northeast; III. Danube to southern Ukraine; IV. Lower Ob to
Pechora-Kama; V. Western Siberia to Kazakhstan and Central Asia. A. From Tobol Reservoir and
Ob River at Belogorye. B. From Tom and Chulym Rivers and Novosibirsk Reservoir. C. From both
A and B.
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Other measures to ameliorate soil moisture.
Many measures other than irrigation have
been taken to conserve soil moisture and to
adapt crops to existing conditions. Over the
last fifty to sixty years the Soviets have planted
an exceedingly extensive system of shelter belts
throughout much of the steppe region and
irrigated portions of desert areas. Farms in
these areas generally have been required to
plant rows of trees on all four sides of large
fields. The state has undertaken the planting
of wide strips of trees and bushes for hundreds
of miles along such places as the high west bluff
of the Volga River from Volgograd in the
south to Ulyanovsk in the north and in the
Kulunda Steppe in Altay Kray of western
Siberia. Shelter belts usually line both sides of
major highways and are often augmented by
fifteen to twenty rows of apple trees back from
the highway between the shelter belts and the
open fields, thus serving both to break the
wind and to supply much-needed fruit. Many
city streets and boulevard medians are also
lined with fruit trees, mainly hardy apple
varieties. In the south, irrigation ditches are
usually lined by dense stands of poplar trees.
Apparently, the Soviets consider the reduction
of wind and the aesthetic value of the trees to
outweigh their rather high water consumption.
The reduction of wind reduces evaporation
during summer and retains snow on fields
during winter to augment soil moisture and
reduce erosion due to runoff during spring
melt. The Soviets have found the most effective shelter belts to be several rather widely
spaced rows of trees and shrubs of varying
heights that will produce maximum turbulence
in the airflow, thereby slowing the forward
motion to a minimum. This arrangement will
combat wind erosion, reduce evaporation to a
minimum, and spread snow most evenly over
fields. Although their shelter belts look rather
scraggly compared to those in the northern
Great Plains of North America, perhaps they
are more effective than the beautiful and dense
shelter belts in the Dakotas that do not allow
much air to pass through. The wind often

swoops over these barriers relatively unimpeded, drops most of the snow on the lee sides,
and continues to sweep downwind fields clean.
This not only means that most of the field area
receives no water from snow melt but also
delays spring planting while the snowpack
immediately to the lee of the shelter belt slowly
melts. In drier parts of the steppes the Soviets
usually find indigenous plants to be more
suitable to shelter belt plantings, but in the
moister wooded steppe of the Central Chernozem Region and western Ukraine they have
introduced such indestructable trees as the box
elder (acer negundo) from North America.
The Soviets have led in working out
effective soil management procedures such as
minimum tillage, furrow plowing, high stubble
refuse, and water harvesting, although such
efforts in practice have often been deflected by
crash program directives from central planners. Some of the most damaging decisions
dictated from above have resulted in the
reduction of fallowing in semiarid regions and
the neglect of oats as a cover crop in the
rotation scheme. Such measures in the short
run have perhaps in certain areas increased the
overall production of food grains, but in the
long run they have depleted soil and moisture
resources. During the last few years, as grain
production has stagnated, the Soviets have
found it necessary to address these problems.
Part of the recent reduction in grain production can be attributed to reduced grain-sown
area, increased fallowing, and shifts of grain
lands to forage and other crops. This has
already paid off in record feed stocks for the
production of livestock products that now
constitute an estimated fifty-six percent of total
agricultural production (Cook and Koopman
1985, 25). And improved soil moisture and
fertility have helped to. even out some of the
year-to-year fluctuations in total crop production in the country. Crash programs directed
from the center still often interrupt multiyear
rotation schemes embarked upon at the farm
level, some of which are quite long since such
crops as sugar beets and sunflowers must be
planted in the same fields only once every five
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years or so in order to avoid diseases, while
legumes such as alfalfa and clover usually are
left in the same fields as many years as possible
because of the high cost of replanting.
The inadequacy of herbicides is still a
major problem. Most Soviet agronomists agree
that the single most detrimental factor in crop
production is simply weeds. During the 1985
growing season, when the Soviets were conserving oil for export, fallowed fields were not
kept clean because farmers lacked fuel for
proper machine work in unplanted fields, and
weeds destroyed the fallowing effect.
It appears that the Soviets are not yet doing
enough contour plowing, terracing, and strip
cropping to combat water erosion properly.
Such practices are often subverted by the
creation of mammoth fields worked by behemoth machines.
On the positive side, Soviet geneticists
have been leaders in developing drought-resistant, heavily-yielding, and early-maturing varieties of crops. But more productive varieties
have generally lower protein and gluten content and are more susceptible to winter kill
(Kogan 1983, 645). Early-maturing varieties of
winter wheat break dormancy earlier in spring
and thereby become more sensitive to late
frosts. Therefore, although winter wheat yields
have significantly increased, grain quality has
decreased, and the percent of sown area killed
during winter has increased.

Complementary areas. One practice to minimize large annual swings in crop yields is
afforded the Soviets more than any other
country because of the west-east extent of their
agricultural land. The standing waves of the
upper troposphere-which are especially accentuated in the upper middle latitudes,
around 50-60°, within which much of the
Soviet agricultural land lies-are positioned
such that the older farming regions of the
Ukraine and adjacent Russian Republic are
approximately one-half wavelength apart from
northern Kazakhstan. Thus, when one region
is getting below normal moisture supply, the
other region is usually getting above normal

supply, thereby compensating somewhat for
reduced yields in the drier area. This was a
major consideration during the 1950s in convincing the Soviets to open up the Virgin
Lands in northern Kazakhstan and adjacent
regions. Most years this west-east division of
moisture supply has obtained (Lydolph, et. al.
1984). (Since most storms track southwestnortheast across the southern plains of European U.S.S.R. and Western Siberia, the dividing line between above-normal and belownormal precipitation generally runs in a southwest-northeast direction rather than straight
south to north.) Therefore, one of the major
adaptations that the Soviets have made to
optimize grain production in semiarid regions
is to grow similar crops in areas spaced onehalf atmospheric wavelength apart. This, of
course, is not possible for smaller countries or
even for eastern North America where the
semiarid lands extend north-south rather than
west-east.

The non-chernozem project. Another way to
combat drought is to avoid planting in
drought-prone areas. In a country where
everything is directed from the center, the
state can decree differences in regional development. The fifteen-year plan that was announced in 1974 included several main thrusts
for the economy, number one of which was
the complete habilitation of farming and living
conditions in the non-chernozem zone of
European Russia. Many advantages of this
zone over the drier zone to the south were
noted to substantiate this decision. In contrast
to the steppelands, this zone has a reliable
moisture supply and mineral fertilizers can be
added heavily without the risk of toxic burning of crops. Of course, not much was said
about the reduced heat resources of this area
compared to those of the steppes. Grandiose
plans were drawn up to drain swamps, bulldoze copses and old fence rows, consolidate
fields for more efficient use of machinery,
improve roads, and consolidate villages for the
provision of a complete range of amenities
such as schools and medical clinics (Lydolph
1977a).
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However, this program seems to have
stagnated. Aside from the obvious drawback
of lack of heat, the Soviets ran into a problem
with resettlement when they sought to establish villages with minimum populations of five
thousand people because this area in many
places is sparsely populated. Therefore, if many
small villages are consolidated into one large
village, farmers will have to be transported
many miles to their fields. All things considered, it appears that the greatest reliance on
crop production will remain in the steppelands
of the south.
CONCLUSION

Thus it appears that Soviet agriculture will
continue to labor under stricter environmental
constraints than American agriculture does.
The best the Soviet Union has to offer is a
compromise between the too-cool north and
the too-dry south, the sub humid-semiarid zone
where neither heat nor moisture is abundant.
Soviet scientists have investigated many ways
to optimize heat and moisture resources and
have recommended uses of complementary
areas within the huge landmass that they
control, but practice lags way behind scientific
discovery, and many schemes that might be
physically feasible, such as interbasin transfers
of water, might not prove to be economically
or ecologically desirable. It appears that the
Soviet leadership might already have made the
unstated decision to become permanent importers of grain while diverting arable land to
more forage for animals and fallow to sustain
long-term use. The Soviet Union is already
importing about twenty percent of all foodstuffs it consumes. If the Soviets can find
exports, such as expanded petroleum and
natural gas, to raise the necessary hard currency, they might well decide that it is cheaper to
import many kinds of agricultural products
than it is to produce them.
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